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New Hampshire Lawyer Search - Listings for A
Name: A
Address: Portsmouth, NH 03801
Phone Number: 603-436-9040
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Specialties:
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Accident & Health Insurance Law
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Cases related to this attorney's specialties:
ISRAEL, DONALD v. US DEPT AGRICULTURE In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 01-1910 Donald and Patsy Israel, Richard and Shirley Quinton, all d/b/a Israel and Quinton Farms, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 00 C 223-Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge. Argued October 23, 2001-Decided March 8, 2002 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Cudahy, and Kanne Circuit Judges. Kanne, Circuit Judge. In 1989, plaintiffs restructured an existing loan with the Farm Service Agency ("FSA")/1 and signed a ten-year agreement as part of that restructuring. The agreement required plaintiffs to pay the FSA a percentage of appreciation that accrued to their property if certain triggering events transpired ("recapture"). In 1999, the FSA determined that expiration of the agreement was one of the triggering events and sought recapture. Plaintiffs sought administrative review of the FSA's determination and argued that only three events triggered recapture: full payment on the loan, cessation of farming, or transfer of the title of their property. The National Appeals Division of the Department of Agriculture found that the terms of the agreement allowed recapture at the expiration of the agreement. Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the Director of the National Appeals Division for the Department of Agriculture, who affirmed. Plaintiffs then sought judicial review of the agency's determinations and argued that they were arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence. The district court affirmed, and plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. I. History A. Shared Appreciation Agreement Plaintiffs, Donald and Patsy Israel and Richard and Shirley Quinton, own a farming partnership called Israel and Quinton Farms. In the fall of 1989, plaintiffs were indebted to the FSA in the amount...
USCA10 Opinion 05-9000.wpd FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 9, 2006 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT RONALD F. VAN SCOTEN; CYNTHIA G. VAN SCOTEN, Petitioners - Appellants, No. 05-9000 vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT (T.C. No. 24946-96) Terri A. Merriam (and Wendy S. Pearson, Pearson & Merriam, P.C, with her on the briefs), Seattle, Washington, for Petitioners - Appellants. Anthony T. Sheehan (and Bruce R. Ellisen, Tax Division, Department of Justice, and Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Respondent - Appellee. Before KELLY, HENRY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. KELLY, Circuit Judge. Taxpayer-Appellants Ronald and Cynthia Van Scoten (collectively, the "Van Scotens") appeal from the Tax Court's decision in Van Scoten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-275, 2004 WL 2785918 (2004) ("T.C. Memo"), holding them liable for an accuracy-related penalty of $2,872 imposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") as a result of their negligence in claiming losses from a cattle partnership they were invested in during the 1991 tax year. Our jurisdiction arises under 26 U.S.C. 7482(a)(1), and we affirm. Background The accuracy-related penalty at issue in this case arises from adjustments of partnership items on the Van Scotens' 1991 Federal income tax return. The adjustments are the result of the Van Scotens' investment in a partnership organized and promoted by Walter J. Hoyt III ("Mr. Hoyt"). I. Mr. Hoyt and the Hoyt Organization Mr. Hoyt's father was a nationally recognized breeder of shorthorn cattle, one of the three major breeds of cattle in the United States. In order to expand his business and attract investors, Mr. Hoyt's father, in the late 1960s, began organizing and promoting cattle breeding partnerships. Before and after his father's deat...
LAMPE v. WILLIAMSON FILED United States Court of Appeals 1000 Tenth Circuit JUN 3 2003 PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT In re: DONALD R. LAMPE and SHELIA L. LAMPE, Debtors. DONALD R. LAMPE and SHELIA L. LAMPE, Appellees, v. No. 02-3221 DARCY D. WILLIAMSON, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellant, and IOLA BANK & TRUST CO. KANSAS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Amicus Curiae. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT (B.A.P. No. KS-01-007) Submitted on the briefs: Darcy D. Williamson, Trustee, Topeka, Kansas, for the Appellant. William E. Metcalf, Metcalf & Justus, Topeka, Kansas, for the Appellees. Anne L. Baker, Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker, LLP, Topeka, Kansas, filed an Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of Kansas Bankers Association in Support of Appellant. Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges. BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.(1) Debtors Donald and Shelia Lampe are husband and wife farmers who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Lampes each claimed as exempt from the bankruptcy estate $7500 worth of farm equipment as "tools of the trade" under the applicable Kansas exemption statute. The Trustee objected to Shelia Lampe's claim, arguing she did not have a sufficient ownership interest in the farm equipment to claim the exemption. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas agreed with the Trustee, and held Shelia Lampe could not claim the exemption. The Lampes appealed. The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP) reversed, holding Shelia Lampe was entitled to the "tools of the trade" exemption. The Trustee appeals, arguing Shelia Lampe does not have an ownership interest in the farm equipment. The Trustee (1) After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral ar 1000 gument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case therefore is...
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